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I. INTRODUCTION
In Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,' the district court
for the Southern District of Florida, using common law agency theory,
upheld service of process on a German corporation through its U.S.
subsidiary.2 Although prior courts have upheld service on a foreign
corporate parent through its subsidiary,3 Lamb was the first case to
hold the Hague Convention's provisions on service of judicial docu-
ments abroad inapplicable, where service was performed in-state
through a subsidiary.4
1. 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
2. Id. at 101.
3. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
4. Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 96. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
cited Lamb in holding that service of process upon a Japanese corporation through a
wholly-owned subsidiary in Illinois based on common law agency principles was not con-
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The Hague Service Convention 5 is an international treaty drafted
by representatives from twenty-three countries to promote interna-
tional cooperation in serving process and rendering enforceable judg-
ments against foreigners. Both this convention and the subsequent
Hague Discovery Convention 6 promote international judicial assist-
ance by creating enforceable judgments through mutually acceptable
judicial procedure. 7
This Note argues that Lamb is inconsistent with the Hague Ser-
vice Convention's objectives and could impede international judicial
assistance and foreign enforcement of United States judgments.8
Lamb frustrates the simplicity, predictability, uniformity, and cooper-
ative spirit underlying the Hague Service Convention. 9 The second
section of this Note describes international attempts to standardize
service of process and the resulting Hague Service Convention. The
second section also focuses on the interplay between the Hague Service
Convention and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 (governing service
of process for United States courts) and common law agency princi-
ples. The third section presents the Lamb court's analysis of both the
Hague Convention and common law agency principles. Finally, the
Note analyzes Lamb in light of the Hague Service Convention's poli-
trary to the Hague Service Convention. Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F.R.D. 194, 199 (N.D. Ill.
1985).
The Lamb court cited Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880
(Ala. 1983) to support the Hague Convention's inapplicability where a parent may be
served through a subsidiary under common law agency concepts. Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 97.
In Ex parte Volkswagenwerk, however, the court did not address the Hague Service Con-
vention's applicability because both parties stipulated that it was not at issue. Ex parte
Volkswagenwerk, 443 So. 2d at 881.
5. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
6. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Oct. 7, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague
Discovery Convention].
7. "International judicial assistance" has been defined as "aid rendered by one nation
to another in support of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings in the recipient country's
tribunals." Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1952-53).
8. This Note discusses only service of process to obtain personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant, as in FED. R. Civ. P. 4. Foreign service of subpoenas (as covered in
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e), FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(2), and the Hague Convention on Service of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters) raises problems
sufficiently different from foreign service of all other process to warrant separate discussion.
However, the compulsory nature of a subpoena renders international comity concerns even
more compelling.
9. Lamb has further significance because parties are unlikely to appeal such district
court opinions. The cost of appealing the court's determination far exceeds the cost of
service in a manner which complies with the district court opinion. If the court upholds the
manner of service, as did the court in Lamb, a additional appeal would only create addi-
tional delay at great cost without reaching the merits of the case.
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cies and its effect on international judicial assistance and foreign
enforcement of U.S. judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
A. EARLY ATTEMPTS AT INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
COOPERATION
Since 1854, various foreign governments have proposed uniform
international procedures for judicial assistance to the United States.'0
The United States, however, declined to join other nations in establish-
ing these uniform procedures, stating that the Constitution and the
federal system restricted participation in such agreements."
The United States' objections were twofold. First, the federal
government regarded judicial procedure as the sole province of the
states. Reconciling the diverse state court procedures would be
unwieldy. Moreover, the Constitution prevented the federal govern-
ment from participating in agreements which would bind the states on
procedural matters.' 2 Second, even if a foreign government was will-
ing to negotiate separately with each state, the Constitution prohibited
state-entry into treaties, an area reserved solely for the federal govern-
ment.13 Because the states could not bind themselves, and the federal
government could not bind the states, the United States claimed it
10. Jones, supra note 7, at 556-58. Between 1861 and 1885, the Italian government
twice attempted to organize an international conference on uniform international proce-
dures for judicial assistance. In 1874, the Netherlands also unsuccessfully attempted to
unite other governments to devise international procedures. 1 B. RisTAu, INTERNA-
TIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL) 5 (1984); see also Harvard
Research in Int'l Law, Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 26, 27
(Supp. 1939).
In 1893, the Netherlands hosted the First Hague Convention on Private International
Law. 1 B. RiSTAU, supra, at 5. Subsequent conventions helped to unify areas of private
international law and establish procedures for judicial assistance. However, the United
States never participated. Id. At the Fourth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in 1904, fifteen European states drafted and adopted a convention on
Civil Procedure that remained in force for many of the signatories for over fifty years. Id.
In 1954, participants at the Seventh Session of the Hague Convention revised the 1905 Civil
Procedure Convention to cover procedures for service of process, taking of evidence, and
legal aid. Twenty-eight nations eventually adopted the 1954 Convention. Id. at 6; see also
Jones, supra note 7, at 558.
11. THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES, 1889-1928, at 371 (J.
Scott ed. 1931); Nadelmann, The United States and the Hague Conferences on Private Inter-
national Law, I AM. J. COMp. L. 268, 270-71 (1952).
12. Jones, supra, note 7, at 557.
13. U.S. CONT. art. I, § 10 states, "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or
Confederation .... "; see also United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 206 (W.D.
Mich. 1979), stay denied, 505 F. Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1980), cause remanded, 623 F.2d
448 (6th Cir. 1980), modified, 653 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1981), on remand, 520 F. Supp. 207
(W.D. Mich. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1979); Note, The Effect of the Hague
Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, 2 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 125, 126 (1969).
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could not participate in any international judicial agreement. The
U.S. isolationism from international private law matters resulting
from this position became so well recognized that the United States
was not invited to the 1954 Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law. 14
The fundamental differences underlying civil and common law
judicial systems also presented serious obstacles to international judi-
cial cooperation.' 5 For example, some civil law countries consider ser-
vice a judicial and sovereign act. Therefore, a foreigner's performance
of a sovereign act within a civil law country may be contrary to that
country's law.' 6 As a result, a person not qualified to serve process
under a foreign country's law could be sanctioned for attempting to
serve process. 17
After World War II, however, the need for international judicial
assistance became critical to the United States for two reasons. First,
a surge in international litigation took place due to the dislocation of
persons and property during the war. Second, the United States
became the leading industrial and creditor nation in the post-war
period. This also caused a surge in international litigation affecting
the United States.18 The increase in international litigation demon-
strated the inadequacy of existing judicial procedures to meet current
international and U.S. needs.' 9 Ironically, while the characteristics of
the federal system had prevented the United States from participating
in any previous international conference, in 1958, the United States
began to make cooperative efforts to establish uniform international
judicial procedures because of the federal system.20
14. Jones, supra note 7, at 558.
15. Service and Evidence Abroad (Under English Civil Procedure), 29 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 495, 535 (1961).
16. Jones, supra note 7, at 537. For example, Switzerland sanctions the performance of
a sovereign act within its borders and would probably object to a foreigner serving docu-
ments of a foreign court. Id. It should be noted that civil law practice, ike common law
practice, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is not uniform. Id. at 530 n.44.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 comments to 1963 amendments.
18. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE-FSrABLISH-
MENT, S. REP. No. 2392, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5201; Jones, supra note 7, at 516.
19. Jones, supra note 7, at 558.
20. Note, supra note 13, at 126. The American Bar Association, the Department of
Justice, and the Harvard Research Institute in International Law initiated studies of inter-
national practices as early as 1936. At the end of World War II, the American Bar Associ-
ation and several other bar organizations again returned to the problems of international
practice. The American Bar Association recognized that an international agreement would
be helpful in the administration of justice and recommended in 1950 "that the President
appoint a governmental committee on international procedures to draft treaties and take
other steps to improve existing practice." Jones, supra note 7, at 558-59.
The United States abandoned arguments that the federal government could not constitu-
tionally bind the individual states to reciprocity in treaty matters that concerned private
[Vol. 20:391
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With 49 separate procedural jurisdictions in the United States... a unitary
approach is the only solution. We can hardly expect [foreign governments] to
look favorably on a program of separate negotiation with the representatives of
each of the 48 States and with the representatives of the Federal Government.
The problems must be solved through a single, unified set of discussions, the
results of which will be effective for all of the 49 jurisdictions.2 1
In 1958, Congress established a Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure to study international judicial assistance
and the effect of international judicial procedures on U.S. judgments.
After studying the current procedures, the Commission recommended
improvements in existing law to the President.22 In response, Presi-
dent Johnson signed a joint resolution on December 30, 1963 enabling
the United States to fully participate in the Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law at its Tenth Session in October, 1964.23
B. THE HAGUE SERVICE CONVENTION
In October, 1964, representatives from twenty-three nations met
at the Hague Conference to discuss and form a multilateral convention
for the international service of judicial and extrajudicial documents.24
On November 15, 1965, these representatives completed a draft of the
Hague Service Convention. The United States25 and twenty-four
other nations 26 have since adopted and ratified this Convention.27
law. Instead, the United States interpreted Article VI of the Constitution to make treaty
law effective on the states as well as the federal government. Id. at 562 n.153.
21. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE-ESTABLISH-
MENT, supra note 18, at 7, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 2097.
22. Id.; see also 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 10, at 9-10; Note, supra note 13, at 127. The
Committee, along with the Project on International Procedure of the Parker School of
Law, Columbia University, submitted proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure and to comprehensively revise the Federal Judicial Code. The pro-
posed amendments concerned the power of a court to render international judicial assist-
ance. Smith, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. Rnv.
1015, 1016 (1965). While the Committee suggestions were unilateral and did not involve
any international agreement, the Committee hoped that the changes in policy would set an
example and stimulate foreign countries to similarly adjust their procedures. See S. REP.
No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3782, 3783; Note, supra note 13, at 127.
At the same time, other American bar organizations were passing resolutions encourag-
ing international judicial cooperation and participation in future Hague Conferences.
The ABA adopted a resolution urging that the United States join the Hague Conference
on Private International Law in 1963. The American Branch of the International Law
Association, the American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, and the Ameri-
can Society of International Law subsequently adopted similar resolutions. Finally, the
Executive Branch urged Congress to authorize U.S. participation in the Hague Convention.
1 B. RiSTAU, supra note 10, at 6.
23. 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 10, at 6; Amram, The Proposed International Convention
on the Service of Documents Abroad, 51 A.B.A. J. 650 (1965); Note, supra note 13, at 127-
28.
24. Note, supra note 13, at 128.
25. 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 10, at 6.
26. 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1 (118th ed. 1986).
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The Hague Service Convention had several objectives. 28 First,
the Convention sought to establish a simple and reliable procedure for
serving documents upon foreigners.29 Second, the Convention sought
to create a method of service that would withstand attack in later suits
to enforce foreign judgments.30 Third, the Convention sought to limit
the potential for default judgments in cases where the defendant had
no actual notice of the proceedings. 31
The Hague Service Convention is divided into three parts: Judi-
cial Documents; Extrajudicial Documents; and General Clauses.3 2
The Convention applies "in all cases, in civil or commercial matters,
where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial docu-
ment for service abroad" 33 and the address of the person to be served
is known.34 Under the Hague Service Convention, all requests for ser-
vice of documents are to the "Central Authority" in the country
where the person to be served is located.35 Each nation selects its own
Central Authority. The Central Authority will arrange for service of
documents if the method requested conforms with local law.36 If the
Central Authority believes the request does not comply with the
Hague Service Convention, it promptly informs the applicant and
27. The United States ratified the Hague Service Convention on April 24, 1967. Note,
supra note 13, at 128 n.13. The Convention entered into force as to the United States on
February 10, 1969. 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBEL LAW DIRECTORY supra note 26, at 1.
28. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
29. Id.; see also Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, at preamble.
30. Jones, supra note 7, at 538; see also REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE CONVENTION ON THE SERVICE ABROAD OF JUDICIAL AND
EXTRAJUDICIAL DOCUMENTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967) [here-
inafter SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT] (statement of Joe Barrett) ("[1i]t gives to our people,
whether litigating rights in State or Federal courts, a very useful tool in furthering a fair
determination of their rights, where nationals of other contracting countries are involved,
that would otherwise not be available to them.").
31. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text; see also SENATE EXECUTIVE
REPORT, supra note 30, at 6 (statement of Richard Kearney) ("[It] provides a high degree
of assurance that if an American citizen in the United States is sued in the courts of a state
party to this treaty, he will be notified of the suit in sufficient time to enable him to defend
the action.").
32. The treaty does not define "Judicial Documents" and "Extrajudicial Documents."
The difference is not significant, however, since both forms of documents receive identical
treatment under the treaty. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 17.
33. Id. art. 1.
34. Id. The broad language of the Convention has been criticized. Countries differ in
perceptions of what constitutes a civil or commercial matter, judicial or extrajudicial docu-
ment, and when there is occasion to transmit documents for service abroad. See Note,
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
Under the Hague Convention, 3 REV. LITIGATION 493, 498 (1983).
The Convention has equal authority in both French and English (as promulgated), yet
the translation of the word 'residence' in Article 15(b) also adds ambiguity to the issue of
the Convention's applicability to foreign corporations. Note, supra note 13, at 136-37.
35. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
36. Id. art. 5.
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specifies any objection to the request.37 The local Central Authority
may require the sender to write or translate the document into the
official language of the receiving nation, before effecting service. 38
Where a request for service complies with the requirements of the
Hague Service Convention, the nation addressed, if a party to the Con-
vention, must comply unless its sovereignty or security is threatened.3 9
Nations must use diplomatic channels to resolve any conflicts arising
under the Convention's provisions.4°
Articles 8, 9, and 10 of the Hague Service Convention provide
methods of service in addition to the Central Authority. Under these
articles, service may be effected directly through a diplomatic or con-
sular agent, 41 through methods accepted by the local law of the
addressed country,42 and by mail.43 Any country may object to these
methods of service by notifying the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, limiting service to transmittal of documents through the coun-
try's authorized Central Authority." Through these articles, the Con-
vention establishes a predictable and reliable method of service that
can be supplemented by subsequent agreement or direct communica-
tion between the signatory states.45
Articles 15 and 16 of the Hague Service Convention address
default judgments. When a party fails to respond to service properly
effected under the Convention, a default judgment may be entered
against the party.46 Under the Convention, a defendant will be in
default only if: 1) service of process was delivered in a manner
allowing him sufficient time to defend; and 2) service of process was
delivered in compliance with the Convention.47 A defendant can have
a default judgment set aside even after the time for appealing the judg-
ment has passed if the defendant can show that: 1) he had no know-
ledge of the document to defend or appeal; and 2) he has a prima facie
defense to the action on the merits.48
The Hague Service Convention strives to give prompt notice to
persons served abroad by providing a simple, predictable, and uniform
37. Id. art. 4. For example, if an applicant fails to complete the proper request form or
fails to specify the method of service requested, the request for service will be returned to
the applicant for corrections.
38. Id. art. 5.
39. Id. art. 13.
40. Id. art. 14.
41. Id. art. 8.
42. Id. arts. 9, 10(b)-(c).
43. Id. art. 10(a).
44. Id. arts. 8, 10; Note, supra note 34, at 497.
45. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, art. 11.
46. Id. art. 15.
47. Id.
48. Id. art. 16.
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procedure of service that expedites delivery of documents.49 The lib-
eral procedural U.S. statutes provide many ways to effectuate service
within the United States. However, the American Bar Association
wanted a simple and reliable service procedure that would result in
enforceable foreign judgments. 50 Moreover, the United States long
objected to certain European service methods that failed to provide
U.S. defendants actual notice, resulting in default judgments in favor
of European plaintiffs. 5' While such judgments may be readily set
aside for the limited time allotted for an appeal, a default judgment
may be difficult or impossible to re-open.52 The Hague Service Con-
vention diminishes the possibility of an unjust default judgment.5 3
Furthermore, a judge may set aside a default judgment under the pro-
visions of the Hague Service Convention.54
C. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 AND DUE PROCESS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 governs the adequacy and form
of service of process in United States federal courts.55 Rule 4 supple-
ments the Constitutional requirement that the form of service satisfy
due process. 56
Federal Rule 4 sets forth the particular manner and circum-
stances of service of process. Any person eighteen years of age or
older may serve a summons and complaint. 57 A defendant may be
served by mail 58 or by any method authorized by the state where the
district court is located.59 The defendant may be served personally,60
through an authorized agent, 6' or through an officer if the defendant is
49. Id at proclamation preamble.
50. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RULES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE-ESTABLISH-
MENT, supra note 18, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 5202.
51. Note, supra note 13, at 130.
Notification au parquet has been particularly notorious in this regard. Under this
system a European plaintiff may serve process on a local European official. Notifi-
cation must be sent to the defendant, but the service is valid even if it never reaches
him. Thus, a European plaintiff can win a default judgment against an American
defendant who had no notice that an action had been instituted against him.
Id at 129-30.
52. Id.
53. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 15, 16; see also supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c).
58. Id. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
59. Id 4(c)(2)(CQ(i).
60. Id. 4(d)(l).
61. Id
[Vol. 20:391
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a corporation.62 While service is generally limited to the state's terri-
torial borders where the district court sits, a U.S. statute or Federal
Rule 4 may extend the area where a defendant may be served.63
In 1964, Congress amended Federal Rule 4 by adding section 4(i).
This amendment was part of a "sweeping revision of federal laws deal-
ing with international judicial assistance." Federal Rule 4(i)
prescribes rapid and inexpensive methods of service abroad acceptable
in United States federal courts. For service abroad to be effectuated
through Federal Rule 4(i), federal or state law must first provide for
service beyond the territorial limits of the state where the district court
is located.65 If federal or state law authorizes service abroad, then ser-
vice under Federal Rule 4(i) can take place in one of several ways: 1)
in a manner permissible in the courts of general jurisdiction of a for-
eign country, 66 2) by direction of the foreign country in response to a
request for assistance if the form of service is reasonably calculated to
provide actual notice,67 3) by personal service to an individual or to a
corporation's officer or agent,68 4) by mail requiring a return receipt,69
or 5) in any manner directed by the district court's order.70
The Advisory Committee notes to the 1964 amendments state
that:
One of the purposes of subdivision (i) is to allow accommodation to the policies
and procedures of the foreign country. It is emphasized, however, that the
attitudes of foreign countries vary considerably and that the question of recog-
nition of United States judgments abroad is complex. Accordingly, if enforce-
ment is to be sought in the country of service, the foreign law should be
examined before a choice is made among the methods of service allowed by
subdivision (i).7 1
Although the drafters of the Federal Rules recognized the importance
of international considerations for enforceable judgments abroad, Fed-
eral Rule 4(i) only supplements the other provisions of Federal Rule 4,
62. IL 4(d)(3). Special provisions provide the manner of service upon the United
States, an officer or agency of the United States, any state or municipal corporation, or any
governmental organization which may be protected by sovereign immunity. Id. 4(d)(4)-
(6). Service upon an infant or incompetent is governed by local state rules. Id. 4(d)(2).
63. Id. 4(e). Federal Rule 4 also provides that the summons shall be issued by the
court clerk. Id. 4(a). The court clerk shall indicate on the summons the date the defendant
is to appear in court. Id. 4(b). Proof of service must be filed with the court by the person
serving process. Id. 4(g). Such proof of service can be amended by leave of the court
where justice requires. Id. 4(h). In most cases, service must be effected within 120 days
after the complaint has been filed. Id. 40).
64. 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 10, at 2.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1), 4(e).
66. Id. 4(i)(l)(A).
67. Id. 4(i)(l)(B).
68. Id. 4(i)(l)(C).69. Id 4(i)(1)(1)).
70. Id. 4(i)(1)(E).
71. Id. 4(i) advisory committee's note (1963 amendments).
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so that service on a foreign defendant can occur under any provision
of Federal Rule 4.72 Under Federal Rule 4(e), state law may dictate
the manner and circumstance of service on a foreign defendant. 73
Federal Rule 4(d) permits service on a foreign defendant through the
defendant's agent.74 Federal Rule 4 provides flexibility in serving pro-
cess on foreign defendants; however, the effectiveness of the service
depends on the enforceability of the resulting judgment.75
In addition to the requirements of Federal Rule 4, two further
requirements must be met before a United States court has personal
jurisdiction over a controversy. First, the defendant must have suffi-
cient minimum contacts with the forum state. The minimum contacts
requirement ensures that requiring the defendant to come to the forum
state to defend the suit is just and reasonable. 76 Second, service of
process must be reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the
defendant.77 Aliens and citizens are entitled to the protections of the
Due Process Clause. 78 To withstand an attack on a default judgment,
the plaintiff must comply with constitutional due process re-
quirements. 79
D. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 AND THE HAGUE
SERVICE CONVENTION
Where the two conflict, the Hague Service Convention supersedes
state law.80 Similarly, if the Hague Service Convention conflicts with
Federal Rule 4, the Convention supersedes the Federal Rule.81 How-
ever, when the terms of Federal Rule 4 neither conflict or contradict
the Hague Service Convention, Federal Rule 4 supplements the Con-
72. S & S Indus., Inc. v. Nakamura-Tome Precision Indus. Co., 93 F.R.D. 564, 566-67
(D.C. Minn. 1982) (service upheld upon Japanese parent corporation through service under
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) upon its wholly owned subsidiary).
73. Note, A Practical Guide to Service of U.S. Process Abroad, 14 INT'L LAW. 637, 639
(1980).
74. See supra note 72.
75. See Jones, supra note 7, at 538.
76. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
77. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950) (trustee
sought to settle all accounts against all future claimants; the Supreme Court stated, "[t]he
statutory notice to known beneficiaries is inadequate, not because in fact it fails to reach
everyone, but because under the circumstances it is not reasonably calculated to reach
those who could easily be informed by other means at hand"); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940).
78. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942) ("To be sure, aliens as well as
citizens are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment.").
79. Note, supra note 34, at 517; see also Jim Fox Enter. v. Air France, 705 F. 2d 738
(5th Cir. 1983); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (Federal
Rule 4 is a procedural method for acquiring, but not for conferring, personal jurisdiction).
80. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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vention's methods of serving process.82 For example, in Tamari v.
Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,S3 the district court upheld personal
service over a French resident in France because France had not
objected to personal service under article 10 of the Convention. Citing
Shoei Kako v. Superior Court,s4 the district court stated in dictum that
the Hague Service Convention is not meant to abrogate the provisions
of Federal Rule 4 when the two do not conflict.85
Because the Hague Service Convention supersedes inconsistent
state laws, service may be effected in a manner consistent with the
Hague Service Convention and due process requirements, even if state
law normally would disallow the same manner of service.86
A signatory state of the Hague Service Convention can object to
supplementary methods of service otherwise permissible under Con-
vention articles 8 and 10. Where a foreign country objects to supple-
mentary forms of service, the Hague Service Convention supersedes
Federal Rule 4. Therefore, even if service were proper under Federal
Rule 4, and Hague Service Convention and due process requirements
were met, the service would be ineffective if the foreign country had
previously objected to these supplementary forms of service. Under
these circumstances, service would have to be effected through the
Central Authority provisions of article 2 of the Hague Service Conven-
tion. In Rivers v. Stihi, Inc.,87 West Germany objected under the
Hague Service Convention to service within its borders by any method
other than through its Minister of Justice. The Alabama Supreme
Court held that service upon a West German defendant by certified
mail under Federal Rule 4(i)(4) was ineffective because of the limita-
tions requested by West Germany.88 Similarly, in Kadota v. Hoso-
gai, 9 the Arizona Supreme Court quashed personal service on a
Japanese defendant in Japan under Federal Rule 4(e) because the
Hague Service Convention between the United States and Japan spe-
82. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
83. 431 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
84. 33 Cal. App. 3d 808, 109 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1973); see also Allen Organ Co. v. Kawai
Musical Instruments Mfg. Co., 593 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (service upon Japanese
corporation by certified mail with return receipt constitutes sufficient service of process
under Federal Rule 4(i)); Aspinall's Club Ltd. v. Aryeh, 86 A.D. 2d 428, 450 N.Y.S. 2d
199 (1982) (service in accordance with Federal Rules is sufficient under the Hague Conven-
tion to make English default judgment enforceable in New York court).
85. Tamari, 431 F. Supp. at 1229.
86. Note, supra note 34, at 504. While Federal Rule 4(e) permits state law to dictate
methods of service in federal court actions, a convention qualifies as a treaty under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and therefore supersedes any conflict-
ing state law. American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 153 (9th Cir. 1957); U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87. 434 So. 2d 766 (Ala. 1983).
88. Id. at 769-70.
89. 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
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cifically prohibited the form of personal service used.90
E. DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARY AS A FOREIGN
CORPORATION'S "AGENT"
Under Federal Rule 4(d), a foreign corporation may be served
through its subsidiary when the subsidiary acts as an agent of the par-
ent corporation.91 United States courts have developed a common law
agency rule that renders a parent corporation "present" in a state for
personal jurisdiction purposes if the parent corporation is sufficiently
related to its subsidiary.92 The parent corporation's deemed presence
in the forum for personal jurisdiction purposes has led the federal
courts to apply the same principles to service of process on a parent
corporation. As a result, federal courts, using common law agency
principles, will permit service of process on the parent under Federal
Rule 4(d)(3) through service upon its subsidiary.93
The United States Supreme Court established that a foreign cor-
poration can be subject to personal jurisdiction when the corporation
is "present" within a state. A foreign corporation is "present" in a
state for personal jurisdiction purposes when the corporation has a
sufficient number of minimum contacts with that state. In Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington,94 the Supreme Court held that solicitation
of business by a foreign corporation's salesman in a state constituted
sufficient minimum contacts to subject the corporation to the state's in
personam jurisdiction.95 The Court stated that the determinative fac-
tor in a minimum contacts analysis should be whether the foreign
corporation's activities are extensive enough to make personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant consistent with "fair play and substantial
justice. '96
The mere presence of a wholly-owned subsidiary in a state is
insufficient to establish an agency relationship between the parent and
subsidiary for service of process purposes.97 A parent corporation is
90. Id at 136, 608 P.2d at 73; see also Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, No. Y81-1265 (D.
Md. Dec. 30, 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983).
91. Federal Rule 4(d)(3) allows service upon an agent "authorized by appointment or
by law." Federal Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) allows service "pursuant to the law of the state in which
the district court is held," and Federal Rule 4(e) allows service upon a corporation not
found within the state according to the law of that state. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1101, at 383-84, § 1114, at 469, § 1116, at 473,
478-80 (1969).
92. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
94. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
95. Id. at 320.
96. Id. at 316.
97. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (parent corporation
not served through its subsidiary where subsidiary had separate business); see also Jones v.
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insulated from service through its subsidiary in the same way a parent
corporation is insulated from the liabilities of its subsidiary.98 How-
ever, when the parent corporation exercises sufficient control over its
subsidiary so that the subsidiary no longer exists independently, but
operates merely as a department of the parent corporation, courts will
disregard the insulation.99
The test to determine whether an agency relationship exists
between a parent corporation and its subsidiary is complex. 100 Courts
have inconsistently described the degree of control by the parent cor-
poration over its subsidiary sufficient to establish an "agency" rela-
tionship. In particular, courts have ruled differently on very similar
facts regarding whether a U.S. subsidiary is an agent of its foreign
parent for purposes of service of process.10'
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 334, 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (subsidiary not neces-
sarily parent corporation's agent for service of process); Comment, Jurisdiction over Parent
Corporations, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 574, 579 (1963).
98. RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M comment a (1957).
99. In Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983), the
court stated,
Alternatively, the party seeking to have service on the subsidiary and the parent
may show that 'Mhe parent corporation has complete control over the subsidiary,
conducting its business and creating its policies ... (or the subsidiary) is a mere
adjunct and instrumentality of the parent ... (or the) subsidiary corporation is
merely a 'dummy' by means of which the parent corporation does business in the
state...'
Id. at 884 (citation omitted). The inquiry regarding the agency of a subsidiary is essentially
a factual one. Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763, 766 (D. Neb.
1977).
100. The leading analysis in the area provides that:
The statement that the insulation will be broken down when the subsidiary is an
"agency", "adjunct", "instrumentality", "alter ego", "tool", "corporate double",
or "dummy" of the parent is not helpful. These concepts themselves need defining.
At best they merely state results. And the results are significant only in light of the
facts. The conclusion that the parent will be held liable only when the use of the
subsidiary is a "cloak for fraud", or is "inequitable", or "unjust", or "unconsciona-
ble", also falls short of describing the standard of conduct which the facts of most
of the cases permit. The facts deal with the manner and method of organization
and operation.
Douglas & Shanks, Insulation from Liability through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE
L.J. 193, 195 (1929). The authors cite more than eighteen factors that courts take into
consideration as "guideposts" when determining agency, and distinguish cases brought on
tort and contract causes of action. Id. at 195 n.8.
101. In the following cases, courts have found insufficient evidence of an "agency" rela-
tionship and have quashed service of process: Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 97
F.R.D. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 F.Supp. 73 (W.D.
Mo. 1982); Jones v. Volkswagen of America, 82 F.R.D. 334, 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Stoehr
v. American Honda Motor Co., 429 F. Supp. 763 (D. Neb 1977); Dr. Ing H.C.F. Prosche
A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1981); Cintron v. W &
D Machine Co., 182 N.J. Super. 126, 440 A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1981); Low v. Bayerische
Motoren Werke, A.G., 88 A.D. 2d 504, 449 N.Y.S. 2d 733 (1982).
In the following cases, courts have found sufficient evidence of an "agency" relationship
to uphold service through a subsidiary: United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp.
1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Top Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni
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No case, however, had addressed the applicability of the Hague
Service Convention when a parent corporation is "present" in a state
through its agent. The district court in Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft was the first to address this issue.102
III. LAMB V VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT
In Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, defendant Volks-
wagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft ("VWAG"), a West German corpora-
tion, moved for the court to reconsider its order of October 23, 1984.
The order denied VWAG's motions to dismiss, to quash process, and
to quash service of process.103 Defendant VWAG "specially
appeared"1 0 4 to challenge the court's personal jurisdiction over it. 105
The court granted VWAG's request for reconsideration of the
order. 106
VWAG challenged the court's jurisdiction on two theories. First,
VWAG asserted that the Hague Service Convention controlled the
case. The plaintiff, Lamb, had served C.T. Systems, the appointed
agent of Volkswagen of America ("VWoA"). VWoA was a subsidiary
of VWAG. Because West Germany limits the application of the
Hague Service Convention and allows service only through its Central
Authority,10 7 service of process on C.T. Systems did not comply with
Viscosa, 428 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Tokyo Boeki (USA), Inc. v. S.S. Navarino,
324 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So.
2d. 880 (Ala. 1983); Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill. 2d. 342,
466 N.E. 2d 217 (1984); Taca Int'l Airlines S.A. v. Rolls-Royce of England, Ltd., 15 N.Y.
2d 97, 204 N.E. 2d 329, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 129 (1965); Kossoff v. Samsung Co., 123 Misc. 2d
177, 474 N.Y.S. 2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88
Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
102. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
103. Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
104. On the subject of special appearance, Wright & Miller state:
Prior to the federal rules, the practice was to appear specially for the purpose of
objecting by motion to the jurisdiction of the court, the venue of the action, or an
insufficiency of process or service of process; a failure to follow the correct proce-
dure for doing so often resulted in a waiver of the defense. There no longer is any
necessity for appearing specially to challenge personal jurisdiction, venue, or ser-
vice of process. This is made clear by the absence in Rule 12 of any reference to
either a general or special appearance and the express provisions in subdivision (b)
to the effect that every defense may be made either in the responsive pleading or by
motion, and that no defense or objection is waived by being joined with any other
defense or objection in a responsive pleading or a motion. Thus, technical distinc-
tions between general and special appearances have been abolished and no end is
accomplished by retaining the terms in federal practice. However, there is no pen-
alty if the pleader, mindful of old ways, undertakes a 'special appearance',
although the label has no legal significance.
5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 91, § 1344.
105. Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 95.
106. Id. at 96.
107. Ia
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the Hague Service Convention.108 Second, VWAG argued that even if
the Hague Service Convention was not controlling, and common law
agency concepts were applicable, VWoA was not an "agent" of
VWAG for purposes of service of process on VWAG. 10 9
The Lamb court emphasized that the Hague Convention applied
only to cases in which documents are transmitted abroad.110 The court
noted that the Federal Republic of Germany objected to alternative
methods of service specified in article 10.111 The court agreed that
service of process on VWAG in the Federal Republic of Germany
would have to be through the Government's authorized Central
Authority. Distinguishing this case, however, the court held the pro-
visions of the Hague Service Convention inapplicable under common
law agency theory when service of process is accomplished within the
United States." 2 The court stated:
The purpose of The Hague Convention is to simplify the procedure for serving
judicial documents abroad to ensure that the party to be served in the foreign
country will receive notice in timely fashion. There is nowhere among the pro-
visions of The Hague Convention any indication that it is to control attempts
to serve process on foreign corporations or agents of foreign corporations
within the State of origin. To ask a Court to find such an indication within the
meaning of the Convention's language is to ask that a new treaty be fashioned
by the Court."
3
In analyzing the validity of service of process under a common
law agency theory, the court stated that the inquiry was a factual mat-
ter that the plaintiff had to establish. 114
The parties seeking to prove proper service must at least show that the parent
exercises SUCH A DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE SUBSIDIARY
THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SUBSIDIARY ARE THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF THE PARENT or show THAT THE SUBSIDIARY'S ACTIVI-
TIES ARE CONTROLLED BY THE PARENT TO THE EXTENT THAT
THE SUBSIDIARY IS ONLY A DEPARTMENT OF THE PARENT." 5
The court applied a common law agency analysis and found that
VWoA was in fact VWAG's agent because VWAG maintained exten-
sive authority over VWoA's day-to-day operations." 6 The court
108. See infra note 129.
109. Lamb, 104 F.R.D. at 96. VWAG acknowledged that C.T. Systems was the agent
of VWoA and that if VWoA was the agent of VWAG, service upon C.T. Systems would
constitute valid service upon VWAG. Id. at 98.
110. "By its terms, the Hague Convention is applicable only to attempts to serve process
in foreign countries. Both the introduction and Article I refer to the transmission of judi-
cial documents, in civil matters, for service ABROAD." Id. at 97 (emphasis in original).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 98.
115. I. (emphasis in original) (quoting Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 522 F.
Supp. 73, 79 (W.D. Mo. 1982)).
116. Id at 99-100. In determining that VWoA was an agent for VWAG, the court
cited:
1987]
406 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
emphasized that the parent-subsidiary relationship made it reasonably
certain that service on VWoA would provide adequate notice to
VWAG, the parent corporation. 117 Based on the factual relationship
between VWoA and VWAG, the court upheld service on VWoA as
conferring jurisdiction over VWAG.
IV. ANALYSIS
Lamb presents three fundamental problems. First, the opinion
interpreted an international treaty without regard to the treaty's pur-
poses and policies.118 Second, the decision erroneously circumvented
a duly legislated treaty by applying a common law agency theory.119
Finally, the decision jeopardizes efforts to enforce U.S. judgments
abroad.120
A. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE HAGUE
SERVICE CONVENTION
In determining the applicability of the Hague Service Convention
for service of process abroad, a court should focus on the Convention's
ordinary meaning and purpose. A court should not automatically
focus on whether service is possible by a method other than that pro-
vided for under the Hague Service Convention.1 21 The Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States states that,
"[t]he primary object of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
intended by the parties for the terms in which the agreement is
expressed, having regard to the context in which they occur and the
circumstances under which the agreement is made."122
The Hague Service Convention was a significant step in encourag-
ing international judicial assistance and in fostering respect and toler-
ance for foreign procedural systems. Over 110 years of negotiating
(1) VWAG's control and supervision over quality;
(2) VWAG's control and supervision of trademark use;
(3) benefit to VWAG of ability to transact business in the United States;
(4) importer agreement whereby VWoA agreed to comply with VWAG recom-
mendations as to the number of dealers, use of VWAG products, VWAG ability to
inspect records, accounts, and VWoA yearly financial statements.
Id.
117. Id. at 101.
118. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
121. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31, § 3, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
122. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 146 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 325 (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
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and compromise were necessary to draft the current agreement.1 23
The Convention's specific objective was to establish a uniform, pre-
dictable, and simple form of service that all nations would be willing
to honor.124 To effectuate this objective, courts must enforce the Con-
vention's spirit and objectives rather than a narrow and overly-literal
interpretation. 125
Even if application of the Hague Service Convention is not
mandatory, additional means of interpretation, such as rules of con-
struction, necessitate that common law agency principles not supple-
ment the Convention. 126 Two rules of treaty construction support the
application of the Hague Service Convention in circumstances similar
to those found in Lamb.
First, the maxim "expressio unuis est exclusio alterius" asserts
that if exceptions to a treaty are specifically set forth, the treaty is
intended to exclude other exceptions.127 Articles 8 and 10 of the
Hague Service Convention provide for several methods of service
unless a country specifically objects, limiting process to service
through its Central Authority.128 In Lamb, the Federal Republic of
Germany objected to the liberal provisions of articles 8 and 10.129
123. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
125. Note, supra note 13, at 141-42.
126. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112 (1933) ("In construing the Treaty its
history should be consulted."); Vienna Convention, supra note 121, art. 32 ("Recourse
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclsion .... "); see also supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
127. "A maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another.... Under this maxim, if a statute specifies one exception to a
general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions of
effects are excluded." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 521 (5th ed. 1979); see also Comment,
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters:
The Exclusive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. Rv. 1461,
1481-82 (1984).
128. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
129. In reference to the Hague Service Convention between the United States and Ger-
many, the Fourth Circuit in Vorhees v. Fisher & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983)
stated:
The terms of the treaty provide that each signatory country may reject certain
general provisions and append specific requirements for valid service of process
within that country. In signing the treaty, West Germany specified that judicial
documents be forwarded through one of various designated central authorities and
that such documents be written in, or translated into, the German language.
Id at 575.
Not only has the German government specified its desire for limited service of process to
the Conference, it has reminded the United States specifically of its objections:
Under German legal interpretation, German sovereignty is violated in cases where
foreign judicial documents are served directly by mail within the Federal Republic
of Germany. By such direct service, an act of sovereignty is conducted without
any control by German authorities on the territory of the Federal Republic of
Germany. This is not admissible under German laws. Under these laws, the Ger-
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Germany's request for exclusion from the supplementary forms of ser-
vice listed in articles 8 and 10 make it probable that Germany also
intended to exclude service through a subsidiary based on common
law agency principles.
A second rule of treaty construction provides that a treaty shall
not be interpreted in a manner that renders it superfluous. 130 The dis-
trict court's interpretation in Lamb, however, renders the Hague Ser-
vice Convention superfluous by limiting the Convention to service
abroad. Under Lamb, state courts could allow any method of service
(such as service on the secretary of state and mailing to the defendant),
thereby circumventing the Hague Service Convention.131 Thus, the
Convention would merely provide a more time-consuming and diffi-
cult means of serving foreign defendants.
The negotiations, advisory notes, objectives, and rules of treaty
interpretation should have led the Lamb court to conclude that the
Hague Service Convention is not merely a supplementary method of
effecting valid service of process. The objectives of the Hague Service
Convention can be fulfilled only if applied in all cases where a foreign
defendant is located abroad.
man authorities must be in a position to examine whether the foreign request for
service is in compliance with the legal provisions established for this purpose and
whether it is in compliance with the ordre public of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. This is the reason why the Federal Republic of Germany has, when depos-
iting the instrument of ratification to The Hague Conference of November 15,
1965, concerning the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil
or commercial matters, objected in accordance with Article 21, Paragraph 2, letter
'a' of the Convention to the application of the channels of transmission as stipu-
lated in article 10 of the Convention.
The Federal Government also considers service conducted under the laws of
individual United States by persons other than judicial officers to be judicial ser-
vice. It thereby follows the legal interpretation expressed by the Department of
Justice in its Memo No. 386 (Revision 2, of June 15, 1977, at 13 n.4). Under this
interpretation, such persons are to be considered "authority or judicial officers
competent under the law of the State in which the documents originate" in the
sense of Article 3 of The Hague Convention on the Service of Documents.
Since the Hague Convention on the Service of Documents has gone into effect
between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany on
June 26, 1979, the Federal Government would appreciate it if service of documents
originating from American judicial proceedings to persons within the Federal
Republic of Germany would be conducted in compliance with this convention only
and if the courts and attorneys involved could be informed accordingly.
1 B. RiSTAU, supra note 10, at 80 n.10 (quoting Diplomatic Note (1) from Federal Repub-
lic of Germany to United States, dated Sept. 27, 1979).
130. Comment, supra note 127, at 1481-82.
131. Note, supra note 73, at 643-44.
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B. AGENCY CONCEPTS AS SUPPLEMENTING THE HAGUE
SERVICE CONVENTION
Three problems arise under the Hague Service Convention when
valid service on a foreign corporation is effected through service upon
a domestic subsidiary. First, civil law jurisdictions traditionally have
been hostile to common law methods of service of process. Civil law
jurisdictions may not enforce judgments where service of process was
effected through the use of common law agency principles. 132 Second,
foreign countries may supplement their service procedures so that U.S.
defendants will not receive due process. 133 Finally, the nature of com-
mon law agency and its case-by-case analysis has produced irreconcil-
able results and unpredictability. 134
The Hague Service Convention resulted from several decades of
negotiation among civil and common law nations.1 35 When service of
process does not comply with a country's law, it may violate that
country's concepts of sovereignty 36 and prevent enforcement of an
otherwise valid judgment. The unwillingness of U.S. courts to recog-
nize concerns of foreign judicial systems could cause a deterioration in
judicial assistance.1 37 If the United States refuses to honor the proce-
dures required by foreign courts, those courts will be unwilling to
defer to U.S. judicial procedure requirements. Compliance with the
Hague Service Convention is simple; "exceptions," therefore, are
unnecessary and potentially harmful to international judicial assist-
ance. International concerns require compliance with the Hague Ser-
vice Convention, even though a foreign parent corporation may
receive "actual" notice when its subsidiary is served.
Negative foreign response to service on a foreign parent corpora-
tion directly through its U.S. subsidiary is another concern. The need
for judicial assistance and compliance with a uniform procedure is
reciprocal. 138 If U.S. courts allow supplementary forms of service,
civil law countries may return to procedures that do not meet U.S. due
process requirements. 139 Service effected in a manner outside the
132. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
137. Note, supra note 73, at 638.
138. Jones, supra note 7, at 516.
139. An example of a foreign method of service that would not meet the U.S. due pro-
cess requirement is the French method of service au parquet. Under this French concept,
... [i]f suit was brought in a French court against a non-resident defendant, service
of the initial process could be made upon the defendant by leaving a copy for him
at the 'parquet,' the office of the local Procuneur-General. An effort was supposed
to be made to give the defendant actual notice through diplomatic channels. How-
ever, this was, in practice, a fiction, because failure to notify did not invalidate the
1987]
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Hague Service Convention abrogates the protective default provisions
of articles 15 and 16.140 For example, countries could adopt proce-
dures that fail to give the defendant actual notice of an action pending
against him. A court could enter a judgment against a defendant and
attach property without giving the defendant an opportunity to chal-
lenge the merits of the cause of action.141 Hague Service Convention
articles 15 and 16 protect the defendant from this possibility. One
British commentator has recognized that the phrase "service abroad"
is ambiguous, presenting the danger that courts could interpret the
phrase in such a way that there would be no occasion to transmit doc-
uments for service abroad.142 The commentator wrote: "[i]t is to be
hoped that those countries which ratif[ied] this Convention will apply
it in the liberal spirit in which it is intended: ... in directing its provi-
sions against the hardship and injustice which it seeks to relieve.' 1 43
Lamb invites countries to frustrate the objectives of the Hague Service
Convention by circumventing the Convention and allowing service on
a foreign parent corporation through its domestic subsidiary.
Finally, the fictional nature of the comon law agency doctrine
makes it inappropriate for application in international litigation.
United States procedural law should be predictable and uniform, par-
ticularly when foreign litigants must interpret it. The agency relation-
ship "test" is very complex' 44 and U.S. courts have applied the test
unevenly.' 45 Thus, foreign corporations cannot predict the conse-
quences of their conduct under the agency test. In fact, courts have
split on the question of whether Volkswagen of America is Volkswa-
service. Further, the statutory period for the defendant's answer was so short that
actual notice through formal diplomatic channels was physically impossible before
the date when the plaintiff would take judgment by default. It has even happened
that the statutory time for appeal from the default judgment will have expired
before the defendant has any actual notice of the commencement of the action.
Amram, Revolutionary Change in Service of Process Abroad in French Civil Procedure, 2
INT'L LAW. 650 (1968).
140. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 139.
142. Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law,
14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 528 (1965).
143. Id. at 539.
144. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text. The courts have also split on
whether federal or state standards apply in determining whether an agency relationship is
established. Compare Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.
1963) (en banc) ("There thus exists an overwhelming consensus that the amenability of a
foreign corporation to suit in a federal court in a diversity action is determined in accord-
ance with the law of the state where the court sits, with 'federal law' entering the picture
only for the purpose of deciding whether a state's assertion of jurisdiction contravenes a
constitutional guarantee.") with Washington v. Norton Mfg. Inc., 588 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979) and Jim Fox Enter. Inc. v. Air France, 705 F.2d
738, 741 n.8 (1983) (federal, not state, standards define whether a subsidiary is an agent
under Federal Rule 4(d)).
145. See supra note 101.
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genwerk Aktiengesellschaft's agent under common law agency rules
on the same facts.146 Courts have reached different conclusions as to
VWoA's agency for service of process or personal jurisdiction over
VWAG even though VWAG operates identically with each of its
American subsidiaries. United States courts should uniformly and
predictably apply procedural rules, especially when issues of interna-
tional comity and mutual judicial assistance are involved. Foreign
courts will not enforce judgments that seem based on arbitrary rules.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. JUDGMENTS ABROAD
A foreign court may prevent the enforcement of a U.S. judgment
abroad when service of process in the original action did not comply
with the law of that country 1 47 When a foreign defendant has been
served in the United States in a manner not permitted by the Hague
Service Convention, the resulting judgment may be unenforceable
abroad.
The Hague Convention was drafted as a contract. All parties
agreed to comply with a uniform international procedure for judicial
assistance so long as the procedure was not offensive to its local gov-
ernment and would be upheld in subsequent challenges to its jurisdic-
tion.148 When service is effected in a manner offensive to a foreign
government's sovereignty, the resulting judgment will not be enforced
in that country.1 49 Lamb, by circumventing the provisions of the
Hague Service Convention through the U.S. common law concept of
agency, encourages a form of service that may lead a foreign court to
disregard a U.S. judgment. Moreover, Lamb encourages other courts
to create local exceptions by narrowly construing the Hague Service
Convention to apply only to service abroad. This construction will
lead fewer countries to accept U.S. service of process methods, even
where those methods meet the requirements of the Hague Service
Convention.
V. CONCLUSION
Lamb's supplementation of the Hague Service Convention with
common law agency principles unnecessarily complicates service on
146. The following are cases in which the agency of the subsidiary was upheld: Lamb v.
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Ex parte Volkswa-
genwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So. 2d 880 (Ala. 1983); Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktien-
gesellschaft, 88 Wash. 2d 50, 558 P.2d 764 (1977).
The following are cases in which the court found insufficient evidence of an agency rela-
tionship between the corporation and the subsidiary: Richardson v. Volkswagen, 552 F.
Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Jones v. Volkswagen of Am., 82 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
147. Jones, supra note 7, at 537.
148. See supra notes 24-54 and accompanying text.
149. Note, supra note 13, at 130; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
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foreign defendants. The decision frustrates the simplicity, predictabil-
ity, uniformity, and cooperative spirit the Hague Service Convention
sought to achieve. Lamb represents a departure from efforts to unify
international private law procedures. The bench, the bar, and the pub-
lic must cooperate to maintain a mutually beneficial system of interna-
tional procedure.
Gloria M. Hoyal
